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Abstract 
What is it like be a narcissist? According to the mask model, narcissists portray a hard 
exterior, but possess a soft core. The narcissistic self is fragile. This presumed fragility has 
been typically operationalized as a discrepancy between explicit and implicit self-esteem, 
producing inconsistent findings. A reason for the inconclusiveness of over two decades of 
research may be that narcissism was tested in situ. An important exception is work by 
Horvath and Morf (2009), who obtained support for the mask model under conditions of self-
threat in sequential priming task followed by a lexical decision task. We report an experiment 
(N = 209) where we test the replicability of their findings with a larger sample and several 
methodological alterations. In replication, narcissists manifested hypervigilance or 
defensiveness (i.e., faster reaction times to self-threatening stimuli). However, given ampler 
time (235 ms as opposed to 149 ms), narcissists switched from defensiveness to self-
regulation (i.e., equivalent reaction times to those of non-narcissists). This switch, being rapid 
and difficult to detect, may explain in part the prior inconclusive findings. Despite transient 
intrapersonal turbulence in response to self-threat, narcissists quickly regain their composure 
and re-establish their granite exterior. 
 
 
 
Keywords: narcissism, the mask model of narcissism, self-threat, narcissistic fragility, 
narcissistic defensiveness 
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Hypervigilance to Self-Threat: 
Further Experimental Evidence for the Mask Model of Narcissism  
Agentic (or grandiose) narcissism involves a self-lionizing, entitled, vain, and 
conniving interpersonal orientation in the domain of agency (e.g., competence, intelligence, 
achievement). Although accumulated evidence over the last two decades has clarified the 
consequences of narcissists’ interpersonal orientation for individuals, groups or 
organizations, and society (Hermann, Brunell, & Foster, 2018; Roberts, Woodman, & 
Sedikides, 2018; Sedikides & Campbell, 2017), the fundamental question of “what is it like 
be a narcissist” remains elusive. This question is the purview of the mask model. 
The mask model originates in psychodynamic theorizing (Freud, 1914/1957; 
Kernberg, 1975; Kohut, 1966). Narcissists, according to this model, may boast a hard 
exterior, but actually have a soft core. Narcissists are characterized by inner fragility (Kernis, 
2003; Westen, 1990). How to operationalize fragility is a challenge. Most typically (but see 
Mota et al., 2019, for variants), the construct has been operationalized in terms of a 
discrepancy between explicit self-esteem (as assessed, for example, by the Rosenberg Self-
Esteem Scale [RSES]; Rosenberg; 1965) and implicit self-esteem (as assessed, for example, 
by the self-esteem Implicit Association Test; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000): Narcissists have 
high explicit, but low implicit, self-esteem. 
The bulk of research has tested the mask model assessing narcissism in situ. The 
evidence has been mixed. Some studies obtained support for narcissistic fragility (Gregg & 
Sedikides, 2010; Jordan, Spencer, Zanna, Hoshino-Browne, & Correll, 2003; Di Pierro, 
Mattavelli, & Gallucci, 2016; Zeigler-Hill, 2006), but others (Brown & Brunell, 2017; 
Marissen, Brouwer, Hiemstra, Deen, & Franken, 2016), including an early meta-analysis 
(Bosson et al., 2008), obtained no support for it even when focusing exclusively on the 
agentic domain (rather than the communal domain—i.e., warmth, cooperation, relatedness; 
Campbell, Bosson, Goheen, Lakey, & Kernis, 2007; Fatfouta & Schröder-Abé, 2018). A 
recent and comprehensive approach, applying an information-theoretic and Response Surface 
Analysis to data from 18 samples, yielded inconsistent findings (Mota et al., 2019).  
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A reason for this inconclusiveness may be the conspicuous absence of self-threat. The 
rationale is as follows (Morf, Horvath, &Torchetti, 2011; Morf & Rhodewalt, 2001; Myers & 
Zeigler-Hill, 2012). Self-threat will perturb the already fragile narcissistic self. Sensing their 
chronic insecurity, narcissists will be on alert for incoming self-threatening stimuli, detecting 
them expeditiously. Narcissists’ quick responses (i.e., reaction times) to perceived threat, 
then, is indicative of defensiveness. However, although narcissists will be initially 
hypervigilant to self-threatening stimuli, they will subsequently self-regulate masking their 
vigilance and, by correspondence, brittleness. By doing so, they will manage to preserve their 
steely exterior, a puffed up persona.  
Horvath and Morf (2009) tested directly, and supported, the mask model. Their 
paradigm involved a sequential priming task succeeded by a lexical decision task. The logic 
behind these tasks follows the theoretical rationale outlined above. Narcissists are assumed to 
have a deep-seated sense of insecurity or inadequacy (worthlessness). Narcissists are brittle. 
If so, when they are initially primed with a negative (as opposed to neutral) prime, they will 
be particularly quick in reacting to words that are likely to expose their insecurity (i.e., 
worthlessness). Hypervigilance, and faster reaction times, to worthlessness-denoting words, 
following a negative prime, reflect defensiveness.  
Let us describe the paradigm and findings of Horvath and Morf (2009) in more detail. 
First, participants are exposed subliminally either to a negative prime (i.e., failure) or a 
neutral prime (i.e., note). Subsequently they decide, as fast as they can, if a string of letters is 
each a word or a non-word. Some of these letter strings are prototypic of worthlessness (e.g., 
stupid, incompetent, useless), some are neutral (e.g., glass, diagonal, violet), some are fillers 
(all negative; e.g., nasty), and some are non-words. As such, the primes can be congruent 
with the target word (e.g., failure-stupid) or incongruent with it (e.g., failure-glass). It is in the 
case of prime-word congruence that narcissistic insecurity is most exposed, and it is in this 
case that reaction times are expected to be faster, as a signature of defensiveness and, by 
implication, underlying fragility. Critically, the letter strings are presented at two stimulus-
onset asynchronies (SOA), short (150 ms) and long (2000 ms). Narcissists demonstrate 
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heightened responsivity to worthlessness words (but not other types of words) presented after 
a congruent (vs. incongruent) prime in the short SOA, but not in the long SOA. Narcissists, 
then, appear to be hypervigilant for self-threat in their social environment (i.e., 
defensiveness), but quickly suppress their responses—exactly as predicted by this version of 
the mask model. 
The pioneering work of Horvath and Morf (2009) has not been replicated with healthy 
adults. We aimed to test its replicability with a larger sample (i.e., N = 209 vs. N = 64 of 
Horvath & Morf’s Study 1). We also made two changes to their experimental paradigm. First, 
we expanded the pool of stimuli. We used, for example, “humiliation” (rather than “failure”) 
as the negative prime, assuming that the unfavourable connotation of “humiliation” is 
stronger than that of “failure.” Second, and most important, although we kept the duration of 
the short SOA essentially the same (149 ms to Horvath & Morf’s 150 ms), we shortened the 
duration of the long SOA (235 ms to Horvath & Morf’s 2000 ms) to test if narcissists move 
from defensiveness to self-regulation faster than previously thought. The presence or absence 
of the operation of limited capacity attention is regulated by the length of SOA. The Horvath 
and Morf (2009) long 2000 ms SOA gives participants time to engage, focus, and commit 
limited capacity attention to the word-target however for the shorter 150 ms SOA participants 
are not given the time to engage focus and commit attention and therefore any observed 
activation is automatic [automatic activation ensues]. The Horvath and Morf (2009) 150 ms 
SOA reaction-times results are explained by the facilitation effect of related word-prime to 
word-target produced by automatic spreading activation (ASA) which occurs without 
intention or awareness (Collins & Loftus, 1975) Expectancy-based priming and prime 
repetition arguments aside, we chose to reduce our long SOA because we want to see if the 
inhibition observed by Horvath and Morf (2009) at 2000msec is present at the later stages of 
ASA which would show narcissists activate and inhibit worthlessness automatically. That is, 
we wanted to see if the inhibition shown by narcissists at the Horvath and Morf (2009) long 
2000 ms SOA was present at a far shorter SOA which could suggest that inhibition is 
instinctive and not self-regulation. Relatedness proportion (RP) is the proportion of word-
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prime/word-target trials in which the prime and target are semantically related. Our target 
word prime trial has an RP of .25 and at this RP ASA is thought to start decaying between 
167 and 300 msec after prime presentation (Hutchinson Neely & Johnson 2001; Neely, 1977) 
therefore we chose our longer SOA at the midpoint between these two estimates. Rapid and 
difficult to detect re-establishment of their intrapsychic equilibrium, following defensiveness, 
would provide an explanation for why the literature has failed to document the mask model 
(at least in its classic, psychodynamic version). We note that shorter (< 250) SOAs are robust 
(Jiang et al., 2016; Perea & Gotor, 1997) and less vulnerable to activation decay (Neely, 
O’Connor, & Calabrese, 2010), processing delays (Kazanas & Altarriba, 2016), or phasic 
affective modulation (Topolinski & Deutsch, 2013). Also, priming effects found with longer 
SOAs are more unstable and open to alternative explanations (Wentura & Degner, 2010). 
Finally, we controlled for self-esteem given its known positive association with narcissism 
(Brummelman, Thomaes, & Sedikides, 2016), as did Horvath and Morf. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
We tested 209 University of Roehampton psychology students (85.2% women), 
ranging in age from 18 to 55 years (M = 21.81, SD = 5.26). The sample comprised 177 
undergraduate and 32 graduate students. The basis for determining our sample size was 
Horvath and Morf (2009, Study 1), who reported an effect size of  = .07 (N = 64). Using 
this as a guide, we conducted a G*Power analysis (f ² = .075; α = .05; β = .95; 2 predictors), 
which yielded an N of 209 (Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007). For all experiments, we 
have reported all measures, conditions, data exclusions, and how we determined our sample 
sizes, and this data is available at https://osf.io/7rxae/     
Novel Features of Our Paradigm 
We specify the differences between the current paradigm and that of Horvath and 
Morf (2009). The first difference concerned stimuli. The negative prime was “humiliation” 
(instead of “failure”) and the neutral prime was “note” (as in Horvath and Morf). As we 
mentioned above, we reasoned that the unfavorable meaning of “humiliation” is more potent 
2
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than that of “failure” and instead of being an agentic threat like failure, humiliation is the 
communal threat of public shame Although we still used 16 “worthlessness” words, we 
included achievement failures, interpersonal rejections, and private as well as public setbacks 
(again, in an effort to strengthen the meaning of “worthlessness”). We also used different sets 
of neutral, filler-negative, and non-words, following validational procedures (see below). The 
second difference concerned SOAs. The short SOA was 149 ms and the long SOA was 235 
ms instead of Horvath and Morf’s 150 ms and 2000 ms, respectively. (The SOA breakdown 
was as follows. For the short SOA: prime = 35 ms; second mask = 24 ms; target letter string 
= 90 ms. For the long SOA: prime = 35; second mask = 24; target letter string =176.)  
Procedure 
We tested participants individually in an enclosed cubicle. We seated them in front of 
a 21-inch CRT monitor set at an 85 Hertz refresh rate, and gave them verbal instructions 
regarding the task along with a 1-min practice trial. Then, we asked them to complete 384 
pseudo-randomized test trials, which were divided into two blocks of 192. Each trial began 
with the presentation of a fixation cross, which remained on the screen for 505 ms. This was 
immediately followed by (1) a brief flickering of letters that contained the first mask 
(KQHYTPDQFPBYL) for 153 ms, (2) one of two primes (HUMILIATION or NOTE) for 35 
ms, and (3) the second mask (FYVDLTMHQWSPW) for 24 ms. We used sandwich masking 
to prevent prime afterimages (Draine & Greenwald, 1998). We asked participants to 
concentrate on the fixation cross, and mentioned (ostensibly) that the flickering of letters was 
due to the program software randomly selecting either a word or a non-word.  
 Following the masking procedure, we displayed a blank screen for either 90 ms 
(resulting in a short SOA of 149 ms) or 176 ms (resulting in a long SOA of 235 ms), and then 
presented participants with one of the 96 letter strings (Appendix A). (We re-primed 
participants after presenting them with each letter string.) We instructed them to decide if 
each letter string was a word or non-word, and to respond by pressing the appropriate button 
on a response box. The letter strings belonged to one of three categories (16 each): 
worthlessness (e.g., LOSER, FOOL, INCOMPETENT), neutral (e.g., FOLLOW, LOWER, 
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USUAL), and filler-negative (e.g., ATTACK, HARM, OFFENSIVE), with the last category 
aiming to distract participants from the worthlessness adjectives. We selected the 
worthlessness words from an online thesaurus (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000), selected the 
neutral and filler-negative words from the Harvard Word Database list of words (Stone, 
Dunphy, & Smith, 1966), and matched all words for Soundex using the Litscape online 
database (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). Further, we created 48 orthographically legal non-
words by replacing one letter with a vowel in each word of the worthlessness, neutral, and 
filler-adjective categories (e.g., LOEER, FOLAOW, AETACK), resulting in an equal number 
of words and non-words (Perea & Gotor, 1997). E-prime presented all letter strings at random 
four times, once after each prime (negative, neutral) x for each SOA (short, long) 
combination. We gave participants a response window of 1500 ms and asked them to respond 
as speedily and accurately as possible; we did not record reaction times outside the 1500 ms 
window. 
Lastly, and after probing participants for suspicion (none expressed it), we requested 
completion of two scales. We assessed narcissism with the 40-item Narcissistic Personality 
Inventory (Raskin & Terry, 1988; α = .89, M = 10.48, SD = 5.18). For each item, participants 
chose between two statements, a narcissistic (e.g., “I think I am a special person”) and a non-
narcissistic (e.g., “I am no better or worse than most people”) one. We assessed self-esteem 
with the 10-item RSES (Rosenberg, 1965; α = .91, M = 18.74, SD = 5.46). A sample item is: 
“I feel that I’m a person of worth, at least on an equal plane with others” (1 = strongly 
disagree, 5 = strongly agree). 
Results 
Replicating prior findings (Brummelman et al., 2016), we obtained a positive relation 
between narcissism and self-esteem, r (207) = .18, p < .009. (See Table 1 for descriptive 
statistics and intercorrelations.). The reaction time variables and the difference scores (short 
SOA) were normally distributed however the difference scores (long SOA) were slightly 
negatively skewed. after thorough investigation we decided to include all cases because 
having a fast (or slow) reaction time does not necessarily constitute an error and removing 
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outliers did not significantly influence the results. We proceeded to calculate difference 
scores, following the exclusion of wrong answers. In particular, we subtracted mean reaction 
times on neutral-prime trials from mean reaction times on negative-prime trials. Thus, 
negative scores reflect faster responding as a function of the negative prime, whereas positive 
scores reflect slower responding as a function of the negative prime, relative to the neutral 
prime (see Table 2 for descriptive statistics and Tables 3 and 4 for intercorrelations between 
narcissism and reaction times).We then conducted a hierarchical regression analysis on the 
difference scores, with self-esteem entered in the first step and narcissism in the second step. 
Narcissism predicted reaction times: Higher levels of narcissism were associated with faster 
reaction times at short (F [1, 207] = 4.14, p = .017; b = -1.88, t [207] = -2.86, p = .005; R² = 
.04), but not at long SOA (F [1, 207] = .43, p = .65). Regression analysis also showed that 
when not controlling for self-esteem, narcissism predicted reaction times: Higher levels of 
narcissism were associated with faster reaction times at short (F 1, 207] = 7.66, p = .006; b = 
-.02, t [207] = -2.77, p = .006; R² = .04), but not at long SOA (F [1, 207] = .76, p < .38). For 
comparison, regression analysis showed that when controlling for target 149 neutral-prime 
trials, target 149 threat-prime trials predicted narcissism (F [2, 206] = 4.13, p = .017; b = -.02, 
t [206] = -2.24, p = .026; R² = .04)  but when controlling for target 235 neutral-prime trials, 
target 235 threat-prime trials did not predict narcissism (F [1, 206] = .94, p = .39). Regression 
analysis showed that narcissism did not predict reaction times for negative filler words at 
short (F [1, 207] = .86, p = .36) or at long SOA (F [1, 207] = .43, p = .51). This result 
provides further comparison and demonstrates that narcissists associate threat related words 
specifically with worthlessness. Self-esteem did not predict reaction times: It was unrelated to 
reacting times speed at both short (F [1, 207] = .08, p = .78) and long SOA (F [1,207] = .03, 
p = .87). Using the same formula to analyse the non-threat related neutral word category 
revealed no significant interaction effects (all Fs < .2).; the observed activation effects are 
unique to narcissism. SUPPLEMENT? -  We considered testing specific facets of the NPI 
and collected data relating to the Ackerman, Witt, Donnellan, Trzenlewski, Robins, and 
Kashy (2011) two factor solution and the original Raskin and Terry (1988) seven factor 
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solution. All tested NPI facets showed good internal consistency (α 's above .70). We found 
that none of the Ackerman et al (2011) NPI facets predicted reaction times at short or long 
SOA (the Ackerman et al. (2011) GE/EE facet(s) is invalidated by Ackerman, Donnellan, and 
Robins, 2012), however three maladaptive facets of the Raskin and Terry (1988) solution, 
superiority, exhibitionism and exploitativeness, correlated with reaction-times at short SOA 
(no facets correlated at long SOA); multiple regression analysis showed the model accounted 
for 7% of the variance (F [3, 205] = 5.49; p = .001; R2 = .07); superiority predicted reaction 
times (b = -9.38; t (209) = -2.93, p = .004), however exhibitionism (t (209) = -.70, p = .49) 
and exploitativeness (t (209) = -1.21; p = .23) did not. 
Discussion 
Two decades of research on the mask model have produced inconclusive findings. We 
identified a key reason for this inconclusiveness: Relevant studies tested narcissism in situ. 
An important exception, Horvath and Morf’s work (2009), did obtain support for the classic, 
psychodynamically-based mask model. This investigation did so by manipulating self-threat. 
Here, we tested its replicability with a larger sample. Also, we examined whether their results 
would withstand the test of time by introducing technical alterations and, importantly, by 
shortening the long SOA considerably (from 2000 ms to 235 ms).  
In our experiment, as in Horvath and Morf (2009), self-threat disturbed the 
narcissistic self, exposing its presumed fragility. Narcissists exhibited hypervigilance (i.e., 
speedier reactions to self-threatening stimuli) or defensiveness. However, given sufficient 
time (i.e., 235 ms as opposed to 149 ms), narcissists switched from defensiveness to self-
regulation (i.e., reaction times equivalent in speed to those of non-narcissists). This rapid and 
difficult to detect switch might provide one explanation for why prior research has found 
inconsistent evidence for the mask model. Despite some transient intrapsychic turbulence in 
response to self-threat, narcissists quickly manage to regain their composure and maintain 
their granite exterior. 
Our research, along with that of Horvath and Morf (2009), constitutes direct support 
for the classic mask model. Indirect support can be gleaned from three other research streams. 
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First, narcissists display higher variability in daily affect or affect intensity as well as self-
esteem, especially in response to dissatisfying (than satisfying) life events that involve 
achievement (Bogart, Benotsch, & Pavlovic, 2004; Emmons, 1987; Rhodewalt, Madrian, & 
Cheney, 1988; Zeigler-Hill, 2006; Zeigler-Hill, Myers, & Clark, 2010). Second, narcissists 
show greater changes in anger, anxiety, hostility, aggression, and self-esteem, especially in 
response to failure (than success) feedback (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Konrath, 
Bushman, & Campbell, 2006; Rhodewalt & Morf, 1998; Twenge & Campbell, 2003). 
Finally, narcissists manifest physiological reactivity—as indicated by cortisol and alpha-
amylase—to daily emotionally distressing events (Cheng, Tracy, & Miller, 2013), as well as 
physiological reactivity—as indicated by cardiovascular indices and cortisol levels—to 
laboratory induced stress (i.e., the Trier Social Stress Test; Edelstein, Yim, & Quas, 2010; 
Kelsey, Ornduff, McCann, & Reiff, 2001; Sommer, Kirkland, Newman, Estrella, & 
Andreassi, 2009). 
We focused on the classic mask model, on agentic narcissism, and on healthy adults. 
We did not address variants of the model (Kuchynka & Bosson, 2018; Mota et al., 2019), 
other types of narcissism (e.g., communal—Gebauer & Sedikides, 2018; vulnerable—Weiss 
& Miller, 2018), or the break-down of agentic narcissism into the admiration and rivalry 
components (Back, 2018; Geukes et al., 2017). We acknowledge that relying on a single 
prime word to represent self-threat is a significant limitation. Further research may try a 
number of different self-threat prime words or theoretically heighten self-threat by adding 
pronouns. Finally, we did not examine pathological narcissism (Weiss & Miller, 2018). 
Future research would do well to extend the current experimental paradigm to these domains. 
Regardless, and in closing, we emphasize our key point: Narcissistic fragility, however 
minimal, is best detected under conditions of self-threat. 
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Table 1. Intercorrelations between NPI and RSES, and Mean Difference Scores among 
Worthlessness Words, as well as Means and Standard Deviations 
Measure 1 2 3 M SD 
1. NPI -   10.84 5.18 
2. RSES .18* -  18.74 5.46 
3. 149 SOA (ms) -.20* .02 - 5.41 48.97 
4. 235 SOA (ms) -.06 .01 .08 .45 52.53 
 
Note: NPI = Narcissistic Personality Inventory; RSES = Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale; *p < 
.05. 
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Table 2 
Reaction Time Means in ms (Standard Deviations) as a Function of Prime, Word, and SOA 
 
Negative Prime  Neutral Prime  
Word  149 SOA (SD) 235 SOA (SD) 149 SOA(SD) 235 SOA (SD) 
Worthlessness  566.83 (78.14) 558.85 (80.83) 561.64 (77.67) 558.40 (78.02) 
Neutral 599.16 (86.85) 591.79 (87.35) 588.92 (87.87) 585.5 (85.33) 
Filler-
Negative  
598.83 (80.70) 586.17 (82.55) 585.05 (88.54) 581.64 (81.04) 
Non-Word  621.19 (85.7) 613.62 (80.47)  611.28 (82.95) 608.52 (83.39) 
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Table 3 Intercorrelations Between Narcissism and Reaction Times in the Target/Prime 
Negative/Neutral/Target/Word and Neutral/Prime Negative/Neutral/Target/Word Categories 
at Short SOA 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 NPI -           
2 H_149_Neg .04           
3 H_149_Neu .06 .86**         
4 H_149_Tar .01 .85** .85**       
5 N_149_Neg .08 .77** .76** .74**     
6 N_149_Neu .10 .76** .77** .79** .79**   
7 N_149_Tar .12 .77** .78** .81** .81** .86** 
  **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4 Intercorrelations Between Narcissism and Reaction Times in the Target/Prime 
Negative/Neutral/Target/Word and Neutral/Prime Negative/Neutral/Target/Word Categories 
at Long SOA 
  
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
1 NPI -           
2 H_235_Neg .09           
3 H_235_Neu .05 .86**         
4 H_235_Tar .05 .82** .80**       
5 N_235_Neg .12 .78** .78** .78**     
6 N_235_Neu .08 .77** .75** .75** .84**   
7 N_235_Tar .09 .71** .73** .78** .86** .83** 
		 **. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 5 Intercorrelations Between Difference Scores at Short SOA and Ackerman et al. 
(2012) and Raskin and Terry (1988) facets of the NPI 
    1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1 diff_score_shortSOA -                 
2 LA -.01                 
3 GE_EE .00 .27**               
4 auth -.09 .87** .21**             
5 ssf -.08 .26** .02 .18**           
6 supr -.25** .15* .33** .18* .19**         
7 exhb -.15** .29** .63** .29** .03 .32**       
8 expl -.16** .38** .28** .38** .32** .26** .34**     
9 vnty .01 .05 .57** .04 .07 .21** .31** .18**   
10 entmt -.06 .33** .43** .31** .04 .12 .34** .31** .00 
 
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Appendix A 
Words Used in the Experiment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Non-Words 
ABRAEIVE 
AETACK 
BRAIEN 
DEOASTATE 
EAIL 
ERUSH 
FIEE 
GUERRILLO 
HAAM 
INHIOIT 
INIERFERE 
NEUARALISE 
OFFENSIOE 
PROUIBIT 
REAULSE 
UXPLOSIVE 
BOAFIN 
CHEEOAH 
UOX 
FEASK 
FLUFFE 
FOLAOW 
INOUBATION 
INCONCLUSIOE 
INEAITABLE 
LOEER 
LIEUOR 
AITFALL 
OTOPPED 
USEAL 
ONSECURE 
WORALESS 
AEATEUR 
EHEAT 
FAOE 
EALSE 
FLEP 
FOOB 
ANCAPABLE 
INCOOPETENT 
ENEPT 
LAAR 
EOSER 
OITFALL 
STAUPID 
UGOY 
UNSUCCESSFAL 
WOROLESS 
Filler-Negative Words 
ABRASIVE 
ATTACK 
BRAZEN 
CRUSH 
DEVASTATE 
EXPLOSIVE 
FIRE 
GUERRILLA 
HARM 
INHIBIT 
INTERFERE 
JAIL 
NEUTRALISE 
OFFENSIVE 
PROHIBIT 
REPULSE 
Worthlessness Words 
AMATEUR 
CHEAT 
FAKE 
FALSE 
FLOP 
FOOL 
INCAPABLE 
INCOMPETENT  
INEPT 
LIAR 
LOSER 
PITIFUL 
STUPID 
UGLY 
UNSUCCESSFUL  
WORTHLESS 
Neutral Words 
BOFFIN 
CHEETAH 
FLASK 
FLUFFY 
FOLLOW 
FOX 
INCONCLUSIVE 
INCUBATION 
INEVITABLE 
LIQUOR 
LOWER 
PITFALL 
STOPPED 
UNSECURE 
USUAL 
WORDLESS 
